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ON JUSTIFIED CREDENCE
Abstract. Brief, unfinished draft of a proposal for a novel and demanding, yet
arguably well motivated, necessary condition for justified credence.
1. Pettigrew on Justified Credence
Accuracy is an epistemic virtue. If an agent’s credence in X is x, and X turns out
to be true, the agent’s accuracy is given by log2(x). Or, if one prefers, the agent’s
inaccuracy is given by − log2(x).1 Note however that one’s accuracy can, sometimes,
be decidedly unmerited. If the ideal credence2 for me to have in X is y < x and X
turns out to be true then although my accuracy is log2(x), this accuracy is not, in
some sense, merited. Since I “should have had” credence y in X, must log2(y) be
taken as an upper bound on what we might call my forecast’s “meritorious accuracy”?
My initial interest in meritorious accuracy was picqued by a desire, which arose whilst
studying some Sarah Moss stuff, to quantify “degrees of knowledge” for degreed be-
liefs, i.e. credences. This ought to involve some degreed notion of “justified belief”.
One might think that a degreed belief, i.e. a credence, is justified just when it is
numerically equal to the ideal credence, given one’s evidential situation. Indeed, Pet-
tigrew (2021), seems to think just this. Here’s one of his (jargon-laden) formulations:
Reliabilism for Strongest-Grounds Justified Credence (epistemic value version)
A credence of x in proposition X by agent S is strongest-grounds justified iff
(ERC1ag) g is the most inclusive ground that S has;
(ERC2ag) the objective probability of X given that the agent has ground g
approximates or equals x – that is, P (X|S has g) ≈ x.
There are several reasons why this definition is inadequate, however. First is a worri-
some ambiguity in the formulation. Suppose X is known to S under the description
“S has the most inclusive ground that T has”. Unknown to S, the most inclusive
ground that T has is g. Then in one sense the objective probability of X given that
the agent has ground g is 1, but that needn’t be S’s ideal credence to have in X.
That problem is perhaps not so serious. It probably goes away entirely if one dispenses
with the fancy jargon and just says what I said before....that a credence is justified
just when it is numerically equal to the ideal credence, given one’s evidential situation.
(I don’t think Pettigrew’s more formal-sounding definition has any clear advantages
over this, at any rate...nor do I think it is intended to be substantially different.) This
1There other measures of (in)accuracy, but as I have demonstrated elsewhere, these other mea-
sures have fatal flaws.
2Assume the universe is infinite. Then there is an infinite sequence of agents in evidential situa-
tions just like mine (which is unique when ordered by, say, distance from me, for some suitable notion
of distance). The ideal credence in X, given my evidence, is then just the asymptotic frequency of
X agents (agents for whom their version of the indexical “X” is true) in this sequence.
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too seems inadequate, however. Suppose that X is the exclusive disjunction “A or B,
but not both”, where A and B look to be obviously independent, with B objectively
much likelier than A. (A is that a strangely shaped die lands smallest face down; B
is that the price of rice in China is above some threshold.) Let’s say I have credence
.8 in “A, but not B”, and credence .01 in “B, but not A”. As it turns out I have
these precisely backwards. The objective probability of “A, but not B” is .01, and
the objective probability of “B, but not A” is .8. So the objective probability of X
is .81...just my credence in X. According to the proposal we are considering, my .81
credence in X should come out justified. That seems wrong, though.
Purely probabilistic fixes to this “disjunction problem” face obstacles. Suppose that
I am considering three mutually exclusive scenarios for the price of some derivative.
A: its price is at least 100 on Jan. 1; B: its price is strictly between 80 and 100
on Jan. 1; C: its price is at most 80 on Jan. 1. I look in the newspaper and, from
the current price of certain stock options, am able to (correctly, say) discern that
the objective probability of A is .37. Without prices for some other exotic financial
instruments, however, I’m just guessing as to relative likelihoods of B and C. That
doesn’t mean my credence of .63 in the disjunction X of B and C isn’t justified. It
is justified, even if my credences in the disjuncts aren’t.
Another example doesn’t overtly involve disjunction. Elementary math students
often confuse the formulas for area and perimeter. Suppose a student assigns near 1
credence to the proposition that the area of a square of side length 4 is 16, a value
they arrive at not by squaring the side length, but by multiplying the side length
by 4. (I.e. by computing the perimeter of the square, which in this case is also 16.)
My reasoning here is something like “the square has side length 4, and I think the
area of a square is 4 times the side length”. But just the first part of this, that the
square has side length 4, entails that the area of the square is 16, and this implies
that a near 1 credence is justified, according to the proposal we are considering. That
seems wrong, because the processes by which the student arrived at their credence
isn’t robust. In nearby cases, where the side length is 5 or 3, the student has near 1
credence in a false proposition. On the other hand, if the student is thinking “I’m
pretty sure the area is 4s, but if it isn’t it’s s2, and that gives the same answer”, then
their near 1 credence is arguably justified.
Here is a final example that is perhaps most humbling of all. Imagine two agents,
A and B, who have identical evidence. Each has credence .4 in X, which is in fact
ideal given their epistemic position. However, neither has complete confidence that
their .4 credence is ideal. A holds that the ideal credence is somewhat normally
distributed around .4, with standard deviation .1. B holds that the ideal credence
is somewhat normally distributed around .4, with standard deviation .01. So B is
much more certain that, say, the ideal credence falls in [.35, .45] than is A. Are we
to nevertheless say that A’s credence is “justified”? Whatever “justified” means, it
seems that it should be an ideal notion. Suppose that B consults with C, who is
completely certain that .4 is the ideal value, asking her “is the ideal credence greater
than .41?” C answers “no”. Isn’t B now in a better epistemic position than before?
So it seems...and yet, B no longer has credence .4 in X. That is, B no longer has
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the ideal credence. We assumed from the outset that having the ideal credence is
necessary for having a justified credence. If so, B would not now have a justified
credence in X. But B is better off epistemically than before...and surely B was at
least as well off as A before. So how can A have a justified credence in X?
These considerations appear to push one to the following proposal, according to which
justified credences are harder to come by than one might have thought:
Justified Credence
Suppose that agent S has a justified credence of x in proposition X. Then,
necessarily:
(1) The objective chance of X, given S’s total evidence, is x.
(2) S is certain that x is the ideal credence to have in X, given her evidence.
That is, S assigns full probability to the proposition “The objective chance of
X, given my total evidence, is x”.
Joint satisfaction of (1) and (2) is surely not sufficient for justification. Cf. the area
16 square or, more trivally, suppose S is irrationally disposed to always assign X
credence .4, regardless of her evidence, and to always be certain that this is the ideal
choice. Suppose next that S’s ideal credence in X happens, by lucky accident, to
be .4 given her current evidence. Then S’s credence is surely unjustified, being the
result of a dogmatic attitude that is only occasionally, like a stopped clock, correct.
An interesting question is how to measure, purely probabilistically and in the relevant
sense, degree of departure from the state where (1) and (2) are satisfied. (To be
used as a lower bound on one’s departure from justification, say.) Here’s a promising,
albeit first blush counterintuitive, proposal: for i = 1, 2, suppose that Si’s probability
density function for the ideal credence to have in X, given her evidential condition,
is fi(x). Suppose, moreover, that S1 and S2 are in the same evidential situation, and
that each of the fi is continuous at α, where α is ideal credence in X given the relevant
evidential situation. Then S1’s credential attitude toward X exhibits greater “formal
justification” than S2’s does precisely when f1(α) > f2(α). This basis of comparision
has the interesting property that if S1 and S2 were to observe an independent sequence
of counterfactual resolutions to X (say in a sequence of randomly chosen counterparts
inhabiting other portions of an actual infinite universe), S1’s distribution for α would,
in the limit, be more tightly concentrated around the true value.3
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3Apparently I’m done, so that’s the end. To elaborate on the last paragraph, though, the idea is
the same as that behind logarithmic scoring. The agent who fares best in logarithmic accuracy is
she who assigns the actual state of big enough portions of the world greatest prior probability. Same
here...the agent for whom f(α) is greatest assigns greatest probability to the sequence of truths and
falsities of those versions of “X” contemplated by any large enough set of her actual evidential
counterparts. Of course, what’s fascinating is how far we’ve strayed from the intuitions expressed
in the first paragraph of this note, once “justified” gets interpreted loosely. (One’s confidence that
the ideal credence be near α becomes a more important determinant of loose justification than that
one’s credence be near α!) Were those intuitions after all bad? If not, are there two distinct notions
of quantified justification? Fine questions if there were any community to intelligently address them.
